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RING OUT THE OLD LAW, BUT STILL APPLY IT
The Co-operative Corporations Amendment Act
As Applied to Non-profit Housing Co-operatives
PAUL STUART RAPSEY*
RtSUME
L' auteur 6tudie la common law concernant le logement coop6ratif et les recentes
modifications aux lois r6gissant les coop6ratives de logement A but non lucratif.
L'auteur examine tout particuli~rement la question des normes de v6rification
conformes aux d6cision des conseils d'administration des cooperatives et qui
touchent aux droits d'occupation des membres et bk la question distincte de la
juridiction des cours pour accorder un redressement contre une d6cheance.
L'auteur analyse plusieurs d6cisions r6centes de la Division g6n6rale de la Cour
de l'Ontario et arrive k la conclusion que les cours ont toujours tendance h faire
une interpretation restrictive de la common law malgr6 d'6tonnantes mesures
r6formatrices contenues dans de recentes lois. L'auteur conclut que l'analyse
juridique, lorsqu'elle existe, comporte de serieuses lacunes.
INTRODUCTION
In 1992 the law with respect to non-profit housing co-operatives vis ti vis
member occupation changed dramatically. The jurisprudence, however, has
remained stuck in out of date concepts. Cases under the new legislative scheme
are decided with careless reliance on the former jurisprudence. The thinking is
cloudy and the rationale filled with double-speak. As with many decisions
affecting the disadvantaged, poor facts in a given case too frequently lead to
poor legal analysis and an overly broad application of legal principles.
The author is presently a research lawyer at the Clinic Resource Office specializing in
landlord and tenant issues, and has practised law both privately and within the Ontario
legal aid clinic system. He was called to the Bar in 1987 and was appointed as Law
Clerk to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ontario from 1987 to 1988. The
opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of any past or present employer.
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BACKGROUND
Since the early 1970s, most non-profit co-operatives had been considered to be
exempt only from Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1 (the LTA). This was
by virtue of what was formerly Regulation 547,2 now Regulation 705.3 How-
ever, frequently the procedures under Parts I, II and m were relied on in the case
of co-operative eviction applications. The reason for this is that Regulation 705
excludes non-profit housing co-operatives that meet certain regulatory require-
ments from the definition of "residential premises" contained in s.1 of the Act.
4
The regulation does not state expressly that there is no landlord and tenant
relationship at all.
The LTA, s.2 makes it clear that Parts I, II and I may apply to residential
tenancies, subject only to Part IV. It also applies to "other" tenancies. These
other tenancies are defined only by the common law. In the late 1970's there
was a failed attempt by the Ontario Government to separate out the legislation
into residential tenancies legislation and separate commercial tenancies legisla-
tion. For reasons which are now historical only, this was thwarted by the
Supreme Court of Canada: Reference re Residential Tenancies Act, 1979.
5
1. R.S.O. 1990, c. L-7, as amended.
2. Classes ofAccomodation Deemed Not To Be Residential Premises, R.R.O. 1980.
3. R.R.O. 1990.
4. Section 1 of Regulation 705 states:
1. In this regulation, "non-profit housing co-operative corporation" means a
corporation incorporated without share capital under the Co-operative Corporations Act
or any predecessor thereof or under similar legislation of Canada or any province
thereof, the main purpose and activity of which is the provision of housing for its mem-
bers, and the charter or by-laws of which provide that,
(a) its activities shall be carried on without the purpose of gain for its members;
(b) on dissolution, its property after payment of its debts and liabilities shall be distrib-
uted to a non-profit or charitable organization;
(c) housing charges, other than charges similar to rent, or any other charges payable by
members shall be decided by a vote of members or of a body duly elected or appointed
by the members, or a committee thereof; and
(d) termination of occupancy rights may be brought about only by a vote of the mem-
bers or a body duly elected, or appointed by the members, or a committee thereof, and
that the member whose occupancy rights are terminated has a right to appear and make
representations prior to such vote.
5. [1979] 1 S*C.R. 714. This decision is now overridden by a more recent decision by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (Nova Scotia)
(1996), 193 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
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In 1992, the Ontario Court of Appeal once and for all removed the jurisdiction
of the courts to use any Part of the LTA with respect to tenancy-type issues of
members in non-profit housing co-operatives: McBride v. Comfort Living Hous-
ing Co-operative Inc.6 However, "non-profit housing co-operative corporation"
is a defined term for the purpose of the regulation.
7
In McBride, the Court of Appeal held that Regulation 5478 took the co-operative
premises right out of the LTA and not simply out of Part IV.9 The Court of Appeal
likened housing co-operatives to a "social club". The "tenant" was bound by the
"club's" rules and regulations. 10
In effect, the Court of Appeal held that, at common law, this was not a landlord
and tenant relationship. Parts I to III could therefore not be applicable. Ironically,
the Government obviously had believed that, but for what is now Regulation
705, these forms of residential living were residential premises as otherwise
defined in s. 1 of the LTA.'1 If not, there would have been no need for an express
exemption from the definition of "residential premises".
The Court, in McBride, held that this was not a traditional landlord and tenant
relationship because members of co-operatives are both landlord and tenant
rolled into one. The Court of Appeal expressly overturned considerable lower
court jurisprudence that had held Parts I to Ill applicable to the termination of
the occupancy rights of co-operative members.
12
6. (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 394 (C.A.).
7. Op. cit. Not all non-profit co-operatives would necessarily be exempted by the regula-
tion. This issue was not examined by the Court of Appeal.
8. Now Regulation 705.
9. The reason the Court of Appeal determined that the LTA does not apply at all is that the
definition of "residential premises" is contained in s.1 of the LTA and the regulation
refers to the "Act", rather than "Part IV".
10. The Court held that in the context of clubs:
The courts recognize the supremacy, in this setting, of these consensual rules
and will not interfere with a bonafide decision to terminate membership
made in accordance with them.
11. Regulation 705 states:
2. The following are designated classes of accommodation deemed not to be residential
premises for the purposes of the Act:
1. Premises occupied by members of a non-profit co-operative housing corporation.
12. E.g., Re Banburgh Circle and Laban (January 11, 1988), (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported];
Alex Girvin Housing Co-operative Inc. v. Booth (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 587 (Ont. Dist.
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In McBride, the Court limited the jurisdiction with respect to co-operative
evictions to judicial review of decisions by co-operative boards and to relief
against forfeiture pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act. In this case the tenant
had relied on the LTA and not the Courts of Justice Act, 13 (the CJA). She had
not sought relief against forfeiture under the proper statute and, therefore, the
Court simply declined consideration of that remedy.
LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
Bill 166, the Co-operative Corporations Statute Law Amendment Act, 1992,
which amended both the Co-operative Corporations Act,14 (the CCA) and the
LTA, was introduced in December 1991. The McBride decision received con-
siderable coverage in the legislative debates and changes were made to the
Bill. 15
The legislation makes it clear that the LTA does not apply to member units in a
non-profit housing co-operative. 16 Section 2 of the LTA has been expressly
amended to this end. The new legislation provides certain safeguards to member
occupants. Although these are not as extensive as would be available under Part
IV to tenants, they are much more extensive than existed under Parts I to H of
the LTA.
Members may rent their designated unit, subject to the by-laws. There may be
grounds to terminate the member's occupancy rights and membership where the
member ceases to occupy the unit. Where "subletting" by members is permitted,
the sub-tenants only have occupancy rights so long as the member remains a
member and has occupancy rights. Lengthy procedural safeguards are provided.
These mirror the LTA s. 113 procedures. The courts now expressly have similar
equitable relief as that provided by the LTA.
Ct.); Re Castlegreen Co-operative and Oickle (June 16, 1982), Thunder Bay #10944/82
(Ont. Dist. Ct.) [unreported]; Re Don Area Co-operative Homes and Lee (1979), 26
O.R. (2d) 40 (Co. Ct.).
13. R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, as amended.
14. S.O. 1992, c. 19.
15. The Bill received second reading on June 23, 1992 and went to Committee of the
Whole House on the same date. It passed third reading on July 13, 1992. The legisla-
tion, was proclaimed in force effective August 24, 1992.
16. The exemption from the LTA only applies to "member units". Co-operatives may also
designate a number of "non-member units". The LTA applies to those units. The
exemption only applies to "non-profit" co-operatives. For profit co-operatives are not
exempt from the LTA: e.g., Re Solidarity Towers Co-operative and Cassady, [1994]
O.J. No. 1265 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
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This paper addresses the issue of the scope of the courts review jurisdiction
under the CCA as amended. There are a number of sections in the CCA that are
relevant to this discussion.
" 171.6(5) - The procedures for awarding subsidies must be procedur-
ally fair. 17
" 171.8(2)2 - ... Membership and occupancy rights may not be termi-
nated on a ground in the by-laws that is unreasonable or arbitrary.18
" 171.8(3) - Subject to the rules in subsection (2), the board of directors
may by by-law determine procedures for the termination of the mem-




There is now a growing number of decisions which deal with the new legislation.
For the most part, the courts still seem to limit themselves to an examination of
procedural propriety. This is both an unnecessary and a disappointing result.
Procedural fairness
Re Quigley and Charles Darrow Housing Co-operative Inc.20 was an applica-
tion by a co-operative for termination of a member's occupancy rights pursuant
to the CCA, as amended in 1992. There were two applications before the Court.
17. The common law already provides that the procedures for terminating subsidies must
comply with the requirements of fairness: see Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corpora-
tion (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) in which the Court of Appeal held that no proce-
dural fairness was required in the granting of rent subsidies but once they had been
granted, they could not be revoked without procedural fairness. This section therefore
extends the principle of fairness to the awarding of the subsidy itself. Fairness is not
limited to the termination of a subsidy.
18. In York Condominium Corporation No. 382 v. Dvorchik LW #1215-024, (Ont. Ct.
Gen. Div.) [unreported], the court held that a rule prohibiting pets had to be reasonable
and consistent with the purpose of the Condominium Act. A rule prohibiting pets over
25 pounds in weight was held to be void because it was unreasonable in the context of
the legislation. I suggest that the courts should apply similar reasoning in the context of
the Co-operative Statute Law Amendment Act. Certainly this is what the section itself
indicates should be the approach to grounds for termination.
19. This section appears to codify the common law position enunciated in Re Webb and
Ontario Housing Corporation, supra, note 18, vis b vis termination of rent subsidies
and extend it to co-operatives vis 6i vis eviction of members. In other words, they are no
longer supposed to be considered as just "social clubs". Housing is an important and
basic right, regardless of the formal structure of the relationship.
20. (1993) 30 R.P.R. (2d) 310 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
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The member brought an application for an order setting aside the co-operative's
decision to terminate her occupancy rights and requiring it to comply with its
by-laws. The co-operative brought an application for a declaration that it had
complied with its by-laws and the legislation in terminating the applicant's
occupancy. The co-operative asked for a writ of possession.
The Court held that the 1992 amendments to the CCA ended the application of
the LTA and the attendant common law to member units of a non-profit
co-operative. 21 However, the amendments mandated procedural fairness and, in
this case, the co-operative had failed to provide it.
The Court examined the requirements of procedural fairness in this context. The
Court stated that the notice to the member of the meeting of the Board to consider
termination of her occupancy failed to give any real or substantive indication of
the complaints or case against her. That obligation does not necessarily include
providing names of complainants. However, the co-operative is required by any
standard of fairness to provide an outline of the specific incidents and conduct
complained of, and even sometimes the names of complainants where they are
necessary to the decision process, to the member whose rights are in question
before the meeting of the Board. Without such information, there is no point to
giving a person a right to respond or to make representations.
The provision of a more detailed list after the Board meeting but before the final
membership meeting did not cure the defect for three reasons:
i) The more detailed list included incidents from two and three years before,
some of which had been resolved. This list was at best misleading, although
its method of outline and detail seem to be more in keeping with what is
required by the process in the Act and the by-laws.
ii) The court felt that the membership vote could have been affected had the
process and original decision been different.
iii) Section 178 of the CCA provides for an application to court regarding
any non-compliance with the by-laws or the Act. It does not provide for or
imply a curing of such deficiencies by the courts. This was especially true
where an important part of the duty of procedural fairness had been disre-
garded.
21. In actual fact, it was the Court of Appeal decision in McBride v. Comfort Living Hous-
ing Co-operative, supra, note 6, which did so. The amending legislation merely recti-
fied the gap left by that decision.
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The Board's and the membership's decisions were declared null, and the matter
was returned to the Board to be dealt with in full compliance with the Act and
its by-laws and the requirement of fairness. 22
Re Labourview Co-operative Homes Inc. and Sickle23 was an application for
termination of occupancy under the CCA, as amended. The writ was refused
because the mandatory notice period was not complied with. The Court held that
the Act, s.171.8, requires that procedures be fair. 24 The application had to be
dismissed as the membership meeting was not properly brought. The co-
operative's Rules used the term "shall" with respect to the notice requirements.
25
The mandatory time period is relevant and material and cannot be avoided.
26
The Court also implied that the failure of the Board's notice of decision to be
signed would also have been a material breach warranting the court to dismiss
an application.
The CCA sets out what notice is required. The failure to provide proper notice
is not a mere technicality which can be amended even where there is no prejudice
to the member. It is a substantive right which cannot be waived.
27
Procedural regularity
In Re Woburn Village Co-operative and Kannundurai,28 the Court refused to
deal with an issue raised in dispute by the member because that issue had not
been raised before the Board. The issue was whether the arrears had been
properly determined. The same conclusion had been reached in Re Mimico
Co-operative Homes Inc. and Ward.
29
This cannot be based on res judicata. Nor can it be based on general issue
estoppel. The application to court is an extension of the same proceedings. In
22. The decision does not review the legislative parallels between Part IV and the amended
co-operative legislation. However, the decision clearly implies more specific require-
ments into the duty of fairness in the context of co-operatives due to the legislated
rights of member tenants.
23. (December 13, 1993), Chatham #2646/93 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
24. Ibid., at pg. 4.
25. Op. cit. at pg. 5. The Act also uses the word "shall" in this context.
26. Supra, note 23 at pg. 4.
27. E.g., see Creekview Housing Co-operative v. Rupp, [1996] B.C.J. No. 75 (B.C.C.A.)
[unreported].
28. [1995] O.J. No. 2485 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
29. [1995] O.J. No. 2216 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
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Kannundurai,30 the Court may have been correct in the result on the particular
facts of that case. This was due to the general jurisdiction to avoid an abuse of
process. However, at times a co-operative member may have quite legitimate
concerns about the process before the Board. He or she may legitimately wish
to have a matter determined by the court. The courts should remember that these
are often unsophisticated people. They should not be quick to deny them access
to a remedy on a narrow or questionable jurisdictional ground.
To deny a member the right to dispute on the basis of blindly accepting an arrears
determination by the co-operative is directly akin to a landlord and tenant court
evicting a tenant by blindly accepting an arrears determination by a landlord.
Indeed, it has been held that a court which does so has acted without jurisdic-
tion.31 There is no statutory basis for this blinkered justice.
Standard of Review
Several judicial decisions have now held that the standard of review of a decision
by a co-operative Board is whether the decision rendered was "reasonable" and
not whether the decision is "correct". Only one judge has offered any attempt
at an analysis of the issue. This was in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and
Arulappah.32 I intend to review this decision in some detail because I believe it
to be an example of extreme judicial flip-flop. By this, I mean that there is only
the appearance of a sound legal analysis. The decision is simply fact-based and
result-oriented. In the end, it is legally unsound.
The member, a Tamil, had a subsidized unit in a co-operative for Tamil refugees.
She took in a long term guest and obtained the approval of the Board to do so.
The guest was the spouse of another member/occupant in a different unit.
Because of family violence he had been obliged to vacate that unit. The guest
was not a member.
The member had been absent for lengthy periods on two occasions. This also
was with the approval of the Board. The first absence was due to the death of a
sister. The second was due to the mysterious death of her husband in Sri Lanka.
She had gone to stay for a period of time with a daughter in Toronto and then
went to visit another daughter in Australia. She stayed away for many more
30. Op. cit..
31. E.g., see Schoen v. Manitoba Housing Authority (1994), 97 Man. R. (2d) 260 (Man.
C.A.) and Re 3071235 Canada Inc., In Trust, and Palonen (November 25, 1995), File #
239/95 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported]; leave to appeal to Court of Appeal denied (March
11, 1996).
32. [1996] O.J. No. 768 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
(1997) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy
months than she had approval to be away from the unit. She did not advise the
Board of this. However, the Board knew where she was and how to contact her.
The guest was to have moved out after the allowed six month period of
occupancy was expired. The member was absent during this time but believed
the guest would move and actually had moved in her absence. The guest applied
for membership and for a unit in his own right. None were available but
membership was ultimately granted. The Board was aware he was still residing
in the absent member's unit.
The long-term guest's income was to be taken into account when determining
the amount of household income for the purpose of rent subsidy. The guest
advised the Board that he had $2200 per month income and that he was paying
an occupation fee to the member in an amount greater than her rent. However,
on other evidence, it appeared the guest was in fact on welfare. The member had
signed a letter for the purpose of the welfare authority that the guest was paying
her rent; but the evidence established that she received very little money from
him and none on a regular basis.
The Board started proceedings to terminate the membership and occupancy
rights of the absent member.33 The intention was to give the guest, who was now
a member, the occupancy of that unit. The Board served the member, in her
absence, with all documents in the proceeding on the guest in her unit as an
apparently adult person.34 The guest did not advise the member of the docu-
ments. The member did not appear before the Board; did not request an appeal
before the members; and ultimately did not appear before the court. Default
judgment granting a writ of possession to the co-op was granted by the registrar.
33. The legislation and by-laws had a number of requirements that the member was alleg-
edly in breach of: i.e., the guest remained beyond six months' without approval; the
tenant was absent for more than six weeks without approval; the member had accepted
compensation from the guest in an amount that exceeded her unit charge; and the mem-
ber failed to pay the market rent after her subsidy ended as a result of her lengthy
absence.
34. S.171.23(4) states:
If a notice or other document is required to be given to or served on a person occupying
a member unit and it cannot be given or served by reason of the person's absence from
the unit or by reason of the person evading service, it may be given or served,
(a) by handing it to any apparently adult person at the unit;
(b) by posting it in a conspicuous place on some part of the unit; or
(c) by sending it by registered mail to the person at the unit.
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On learning from another member that something was going on, she had advised
the Board that she would be returning within a number of weeks.
The Court reviewed the legislative changes. It recognized that under the pre-
1992 regime there was limited review by the courts of a co-operative's decision
to evict one of its members. It stated that if the eviction was in accordance with
the co-operative's own by-laws and did not breach principles of natural justice
and procedural fairness, the courts would not intervene. However, the Court
acknowledged that in 1992 there were "sweeping legislative amendments"
which gave co-operative members "substantially, but not entirely, the same
protections" as are provided to tenants under Part IV of the LTA. Having
accepted this, the Court nevertheless held that the philosophy underlying co-
operative housing would be completely undermined if the decisions of co-oper-
atives were treated in the same manner by the courts as decisions of private
landlords. 3
5
The Court correctly stated that the Court of Appeal judgment in McBride v.
Comfort Living Housing Co-operative36 is distinguishable as being made in the
context of the law prior to the CCA amendments. It expressly finds that McBride
is not binding authority. At the same time, it finds itself in substantial agreement
with the views expressed in that decision, - views which were based solely on
the pre-amendment common law and pre-amendment relationship between
members and the co-operative.
The Court noted that co-operatives do not have untrammelled powers over their
members. Under the CCA, the courts have a "supervisory role to ensure that
members are treated fairly and in accordance with the legislation and the
by-laws". The Court held that, generally, it should not intervene if the member
has been dealt with in accordance with the principles of natural justice and
procedural fairness and if the Board had a rational basis for its decision in the
circumstances.
The decision expressly finds that the Board in this case had no valid proven
ground for terminating the occupancy or membership of the member. However,
the Court concluded that the Board did not have to make a correct decision. If
the decision of a Board is reasonable, that is sufficient. In other words, the
35. According to the Court, the legislatively protected rights of co-operative members are
not the same as those of ordinary tenants in recognition of their enhanced rights as
members in the democratic management of the co-operative. The Court makes this
finding on the basis of an admitted presumption: i.e., there was no evidence of this
before the Court.
36. Supra, note 6.
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standard for judicial review of decisions by expert tribunals was applied. 37 In
making this finding, the Court applied two earlier decisions which had made the
same finding without any analysis of the issue.
38
It is important to determine the nature of the courts' role under the CCA. If, as
the Court in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and Arulappah suggests, that
role is merely supervisory, then the CCA as amendments serve no purpose. The
CCA refers to the co-operative "applying" to court for a writ of possession.
39
This is clearly not an appeal.40 Moreover, it does not give the member him or
herself the independent right to apply to court. Rather, only if a co-operative
applies may a member "dispute" the application. Therefore, it would seem that
the court application is merely a further step in the initial process.
There is no statutory basis for the very restrictive approach to jurisdiction taken
in decisions such as Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. Presumably where the
right to dispute the co-operative's court application is granted, the member is
entitled to a full dispute. Nothing in the legislation restricts this right. 41 Nothing
in these decisions addresses the fact that this legislation was remedial in all
respects.
Re La Paz Co-operative Homes Inc. and Jackson42 is a decision in the same
vein by the same judge that decided Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and
Arulappah.43 The facts are not as sympathetic toward the member in question.
The co-operative was founded to accommodate the needs of recently arrived
37. Yet the same judge has held that the court proceedings contemplated under the CCA
are not judicial review: see Re La Paz Co-operative Homes Inc. and Jackson, [1996]
O.J. No. 1181 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported], discussed later in this paper. More-
over, boards are almost certainly not expert tribunals to which deference of the type
accorded in these cases ought to be given.
38. [.e., Re Mimico Co-operative Homes Inc. and Ward, [1995] O.J. No. 2216 (Ont. Ct.
Gen. Div.) [unreported] and, following this decision, Re Woburn Village Co-operative
Homes Inc. and Kannundurai, [1995] O.J. No. 2485 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
39. S.171.13.
40. An appeal ultimately lies from the decision of the court to the Divisional Court: CCA,
s. 171.16. This appeal is not limited. It is a broad right of appeal from the final decision.
41. The absurdity of the position in these cases is taken to extremes by the Court's finding
with respect to the reasonable basis of the decision in Re Mimico Co-operative Homes
Inc. and Ward, supra, note 38. The Court concluded the reasonable basis was that the
staff was intimidated by the member's "physical bearing and striking appearance" and
by his "pride, intelligence and rigorous logic", at 4-5! Quaere: How is such a ground
reasonable? How is it correct?
42. (1996] OJ. No. 1181 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
43. Supra, note 33.
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refugees from El Salvador. Not all residents were Salvadorean. Some units were
for low income individuals and some were specifically for abused wives and
their children.
The member was a non-Salvadorean single mother who was studying to be a
legal assistant. She felt alienated partly because she did not speak Spanish and
most of the other residents communicated in Spanish. Her unit was above the
co-operative meeting and party room. The member complained frequently about
the noise and on several instances had called the police. The member did not
have a good relationship with the board and was belligerent and (as found by
the court) prone to hysteria. The board formed a "task force" to investigate the
allegations of noise and ways to resolve the problem. The member was a
participant. The group met only once.
The co-operative rules contained a prohibition against violence toward other
residents and employees. After one party in which the member had complained
to the police, she became involved in an altercation with the Salvadorean person
whose party it was. This person was a board member. The police were called
and the member was charged after witnesses confirmed that an assault as alleged
had taken place. The member's version of the incident was quite different.
One of the board members sitting at the meeting to decide the issue of the
member's eviction was a member who had signed a petition against the member
at an earlier meeting. At that meeting the board member in question had
disqualified himself from participating. Without this member's presence at the
later meeting there would have been no quorum.
In determining whether or not the board had a reasonable basis for its decision,
the Court found that it was entitled to look at the facts and the evidence in support
of those facts. Since the member was attempting to stab another member, the
board had a reasonable basis for determining that these actions were contrary to
the rules and grounds for eviction.
44
The main objection to the fairness of the proceedings themselves was that a
proper quorum was not in place. The Court had heard no evidence to suggest
any personal animosity between the board member and the member.45 It held
that it would be unreasonable to suggest that only board members with no
44. Oddly, the Court makes no mention that this was not only a reasonable decision on the
facts as found, but also a correct decision in terms of grounds for termination.
45. One of the basic tenets of natural justice is that justice must not only be done but that it
must be seen to be done. Another is that there should be no reasonable apprehension of
bias. Actual bias need not be shown.
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foreknowledge or no opinion could sit at the Board hearing. This was a closely
knit community. There was no doubt in the Court's mind that the scuffle was
the subject of much discussion, conjecture and gossip between them. This was,
in the Court's expressed opinion, incidental to the very unique nature of the
co-operative. 46
As in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and Arulappah, the Court follows
pre-amendment jurisprudence confining the courts' jurisdiction.47 This seems
quite inappropriate.
The Court held that the proceedings before it under the CCA were not judicial
review.48 This is true. Nevertheless, the decision of a Board is now definitely a
statutory power of decision outlined expressly and in detail in the CCA.49
Decisions of the Board must now be subject to judicial review in appropriate
circumstances regardless of the statutory right of appeal.
50
Power to grant relief against forfeiture
The decision in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and Arulappah51 is disturb-
ing for another reason other than its finding on the standard of review by the
courts. Its analysis of the courts' now express jurisdiction to grant relief against
forfeiture under the CCA, as amended, is troublesome. The Court held that it
would be an unusual situation which could be seen as both (1) procedurally fair
to the member and (2) a reasonable decision in the circumstances but which
would also lead the judge to conclude that it would be unfair to grant the writ
46. However, the court expressly stated that it was not suggesting that one group or clique,
or one specific nationality in a co-operative is entitled to "gang up" on another member
because he or she is an outsider.
47. One of the decisions was the very decision which spurred the Legislature into making
the amendments in the first place: McBride v. Comfort Living (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 394
(C.A.). The other was the decision in Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation, dis-
cussed above at note 17.
48. I suggest that this conclusion is eminently self-evident. For that very reason, the type of
deference accorded in judicial review is not appropriate. As previously suggested in this
paper, the court proceedings are merely a final step in the initial proceeding.
49. This was not the case in the Court of Appeal decision in Re Webb and Ontario Housing
Corporation, supra, note 17. The decision of the Board in that case was not regulated
by legislation. It was not a judicial or quasi-judicial decision subject to review by the
courts. Moreover the applicant had no justiciable right to the rent subsidy in that case.
50. The Judicial Review Procedure Act R.S.O. 1990, c. J-1, s-s.2(1) expressly provides for
the remedy of judicial review, despite any appeal right. Of course, judicial review is
itself a discretionary remedy. Rarely would it be granted where an appeal right exists.
51. Supra, note 33.
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of possession. 52 The Court in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. held that the
CCA gives the judge discretion to exercise on an equitable basis in only those
exceptional circumstances. 53 The Court was, however, appropriately concerned
that the unit had been given to the guest who did not have clean hands and who
has clearly benefitted from his own deceit. Despite this significant concern, in
the Court's opinion there was no basis to exercise the Court's discretion in favour
of the member.
54
While recognizing an independent power to grant relief, the Court refused to do
so in Re Coady Housing Co-operative Inc. and Fekete.55 The Court stated:
... it would require some demonstration of error or a clear case of unfair-
ness in process in order to justify the court's intervention at this stage to
relieve against forfeiture 56 [emphasis added].
I suggest that the Court has not stated the law correctly. The unfairness with
which the court should be concerned has nothing to do with "process". That is
52. Re Highland Homes Inc. and Lundrigan, [1994] O.J. No. 323 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)
[unreported] appears to take this approach. The Court seemed to think that as long as
the procedure followed was correct, that was the end of the matter. The conduct of the
tenant, her children and a pet were in question. The Court held that it was not unfair in
the circumstances to order termination despite some improved conduct after the pro-
ceedings had been commenced. As far as the court was concerned, the grounds for ter-
mination were sufficient and the proper procedure had been followed.
53. It is unsettling that the Court makes this highly restrictive interpretative finding after
concluding that:
(1) the discretion given to a judge to refuse a writ of possession under s. 171.21(2)(a) is
similar to the discretion a judge has under s. 121(2)(a) of the LTA and the two provis-
ions should be interpreted in the same manner;
(2) the provision enables the court to refuse a writ of possession based on equitable
considerations even when the landlord has otherwise met the legal requirements for its
issuance; and
(3) the Court has the discretion to refuse the writ of possession notwithstanding the co-
operative's compliance with the CCA and its own by-laws, based on overall considera-
tions of fairness after weighing the interests of the parties and, if relevant, the public
interest.
54. See also Re La Paz Co-operative Homes Inc. and Jackson, supra, note 43, in which the
same judge denies relief after considering the overriding jurisdiction to grant relief
against forfeiture. It held that to keep her in these premises would simply be inviting
continuing trouble. Relief was refused even though the member would be subjected to
economic hardship.
55. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 674 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
56. Ibid. at page 677.
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a separate issue. If the process were found to be unfair, then the court must
decline to grant the writ. That is mandatory. Where relief against forfeiture is
concerned, the issue is "having regard to all the circumstances, that it would be
unfair to grant the writ".57 The court must consider all the circumstances.
58
The Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. decision and these other restrictive
decisions do not seem consistent which much of the pre-existing case law. For
example, Re Arauco Housing Corporation and Baron59 was an application to
evict a co-operative member under s.76 of Part III of the LTA. 60 Despite the
Board having followed proper procedure and committing no error, the trial judge
refused to grant the writ in the circumstances of the case. The Court did not refer
to a relief from forfeiture provision per se. Rather it looked at the use of the
word "may" in the context of the power of the court to grant a writ of possession.
The Divisional Court affirmed the decision stating that whether the power of
the Court was found in the LTA or under the Rules,6 1 the word "may", found in
both provisions, is permissive. In this case, the Divisional Court held that
the discretion was exercised upon an appropriate consideration of the evi-
dence of the personal circumstances of the tenant...
There was no basis for the appeal court to interfere.
62
CONCLUSION
The misguided deference accorded to Boards of Co-operatives in decisions such
as Re Tamil Co-operative Housing Inc. are presumably based on the assumption
57. Le., CCA, s.171.21(1)(a).
58. This includes the member's circumstances. An example of a decision in which the juris-
diction to grant relief was properly exercised is Re Ventura Park Housing Co-operative
Inc. and Conway (September 1, 1994) #33461/94 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported].
The court took into consideration all the circumstances, including the closeness of the
vote to evict the member. So, too, in Re Castlegreen Co-operative Inc. and Strand,
[1995] O.J. No. 2460 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported], the Court refused to grant the
writ despite some evidence to substantiate reasonable grounds for termination of mem-
bership. The Court held it would be unfair to grant the writ where the respondent had
been a member for ten years, had serious disabilities and severely limited resources.
59. (January 21, 1991), Toronto File # L14089/91 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [unreported]; aff'd
(January 19, 1993) File #119/91 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [unreported].
60. This case was prior to the CCA amendments of 1992.
61. Le., Rule 60.
62. Section 117.13(12) of the CCA also uses "may" with respect to the court's power to
grant a writ. Moreover, in addition to the general discretion, there is an express relief
from forfeiture provision.
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that co-operatives are benevolent dictators or true democracies. Unfortunately,
that is not always the reality. Too often, there are cliques and the co-operative
becomes the fiefdom of a few interest groups or individuals. 63 Members are
often in no better position with many boards than are many tenants with
landlords.
The small private and for profit co-operatives may have been a true "club" of
equals; but this is not the case for large non-profit co-operatives. Many of the
most needy members are the most vulnerable and the least able or likely to
participate as equals.
Boards of housing co-operatives are volunteers. They are also not experts in
policy or procedure and rarely in legal principles. It is precisely for that reason
that the supervision of the courts is required. Housing is too important a right
to be dealt with lightly.
The decisions in Re Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. and in Re La Paz Co-oper-
ative Homes Inc. and Jackson pay lip service to a liberal philosophy and a
remedial approach to legislation but in reality, blatantly ignore both by sticking
rigidly to the pre-amendment jurisprudence. It is always unfortunate when
judges make overly broad proclamations where a narrow finding on the facts
and limited to the facts would have been justified, and more appropriate.
63. Even the Court in Re La Paz Co-operative Homes Inc. and Jackson, supra, note 43
gives passing comment on this possibility. In that decision, Molloy, J., states that no
one group or clique or nationality within a co-operative housing complex should be
entitled to gang up on an outsider who lived in the co-operative.
